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THE government's charge that Dr. Bruce Ivins, a top Army biodefense scientist, was responsible 
for the 2001 anthrax mailings has focused renewed attention on the important question of 
whether we are adequately prepared to protect against a future bioweapons attack. More than $20 
billion has been spent on biodefense research since 2001. But the genetic analysis demonstrating 
that the anthrax powder used in the 2001 letters was a formulation first made at the Army 
biodefense research center at Fort Detrick, Md., suggests that our biodefense program risks 
creating the very threat it is meant to fight.  
Spending on biodefense research began to edge up after the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo's failed 
attempts to develop and use bioweapons in Tokyo in the 1990s. After the anthrax letters killed 
five and injured 17 others, some argued that it was not a question of if, but of when terrorists 
would again use bioweapons against Americans, and biodefense spending exploded. At the 
National Institutes of Health, research on bioweapons agents has increased from $53 million in 
2001 to more than $1.6 billion in 2008. During the same time, the Department of Defense has 
more than doubled its investment in biodefense, to more than $1 billion.  
An unprecedented expansion of research facilities is also under way. Once these laboratories are 
completed, we will have 10 times as much lab space as we had in 2001 for working on the most 
dangerous agents -- Ebola and Marburg viruses, for example -- and 13 new regional labs for 
working on moderate and high-risk agents like tularemia and plague. Thousands of scientists are 
now working with bioweapons agents, many for the first time. More than 14,000 scientists have 
been approved to work with so-called select agents like anthrax that usually pose little threat to 
public health unless they are used as bioweapons.  
Experienced anthrax researchers now speak of a community that has grown so large, so rapidly -- 
more than 7,200 researchers are now approved to work with this deadly agent -- they no longer 
know everyone else in the field.  
Since the boom began, bioweapons agents have been mishandled in a number of incidents. In 
2004, live anthrax was accidentally shipped to a children's hospital research lab in Oakland, 
Calif., and three lab researchers at Boston University developed tularemia after being exposed to 
the bacteria that causes it. In 2006, researchers at Texas A&M were exposed to brucellosis and Q 
fever. As an investigator for the Government Accountability Office reported to Congress last 
fall, the greater number of researchers handling bioweapons agents has increased the risk of such 
accidents.  
Even more worrying are the security risks. The United States' own biodefense program has now 
been tied directly to the deadliest biological attack ever in the country. That alone demonstrates 
that we need a rigorous, fact-driven assessment of bioweapons threats, both from other counties 
and from terrorists, domestic and foreign. The first step is to ensure that we have a full public 
examination of all the government's evidence in the 2001 anthrax mailings, so that we can find 
out what went wrong and how to keep it from happening again. 
Then we must re-examine our overall biodefense research strategy, set clear priorities and 
strengthen the safety, security and oversight of laboratories working with dangerous agents. 
Rather than add more laboratories and create more research projects, we need to focus on key 
efforts in fewer facilities. This should include pursuing diagnostic techniques, vaccines and 
treatments that can be applied to more than one biological agent. Most of this research does not 
require working with actual deadly agents until the very final stages.  
Our excess biodefense research capacity could then be used for research on everyday public 
health threats like tuberculosis and antibiotic-resistant bacteria, many of which have not received 
sufficient attention since 9/11.  
To defend against bioweapons, we need not more but better research efforts. The probability that 
biological weapons will be used against Americans is low, but the consequences of such an 
attack could be devastating. We cannot meet the threat safely or effectively with a strategy that 
puts bioweapons agents in more and more people's hands.  
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